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																																																													Conversion	Theory	II:	the	case	for	Recession	Bonds	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning	Introduction		The	IMF,	 in	a	recent	report,	calculated	that	global	debt	has	reached	the	level	of	$164	trillion1,	with	a	global	GDP	level	of	$85	trillion.	On	a	per	capita	basis,	 this	amount	translates	into	a	debt	of	$86,000	per	each	individual	in	the	world.	This	is	more	than	2.5	times	average	annual	income	level.		Governments	owe	$61	trillion	of	this	debt.	The	U.S.,	Eurozone,	Japan	and	China	account	for	a	substantial	share	of	this	debt.		In	 a	 previous	 paper:	 “Conversion	 Theory:	 The	 key	 to	 understanding	 economic	developments	before	and	after	 the	2008	 financial	crisis”2,	 the	author	explained	that	 an	 individual	 inability	 to	 service	 a	mortgage	 loan	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 collective	inability,	 through	 falling	 house	 prices,	 increasing	 unemployment	 levels	 and	lower	real	median	incomes.	The	conversion	of	long-term	mortgage	loans	occurs	when	such	mortgage	loans	are	converted	into	daily	tradable	securities.	When	the	obligations	 of	 potential	 doubtful	 debtors	 are	 co-mingled	 with	 that	 of	 secure	borrowers	and	the	composite	securities	are	given	AA	or	AA+	ratings	by	the	risk	rating	 agencies,	 doubts	 about	 the	 payment	 capacity	 of	 a	 group	 of	 borrowers	locked	into	the	security,	easily	leads	to	collective	fear.	Liquidity	in	the	mortgage-backed	securities	disappeared	and	set	off	a	series	of	negative	economic	growth	effects	 including	 widespread	 foreclosure	 proceedings	 in	 the	 U.S.	 (41.4%	 of	 all	mortgage	 holders	 over	 the	 period	 2007-2014).	 The	 end	 result	 was	 a	 global	recession,	firstly	affecting	the	U.S.	economy	and	subsequently	spreading	through	a	domino	effect	to	Europe	and	the	Far	East.		To	mitigate	the	effects	of	recession,	particularly	one	on	the	scale	of	the	recession	that	followed	the	global	financial	crisis,	a	new	flexible	sovereign	debt	instrument	may	 be	 needed,	 covering	 the	 largest	 economies	 as	 well	 as	 the	 periphery	 of	smaller	countries	–Recession	Bonds.	The	International	Monetary	Fund	(“IMF”)	is	well	 placed	 to	 accommodate	 such	 an	 approach,	 but	 it	 needs	 to	 rethink	 which	instruments	are	best	suited	for	the	job.	For	instance,	its	current	maximum	facility	is	$1	trillion	to	lend	to	member	states.	This	is	a	sizable	amount,	but	it	is	dwarfed	by	 the	 $61	 trillion	 outstanding	 global	 government	 debt.	 Another	 example	 has	been	the	$4.5	trillion	government	debt	 increase	that	the	U.S.	alone	experienced	between	 2007-2010.	 Even	 in	 the	 Eurozone,	 the	 government	 debt	 to	 GDP	 ratio	increased	 from	 64.9%	 in	 2007	 to	 91.9%	 in	 2014,	 a	 relatively	 large	 change	 of	41.6%	in	five	years.		What	 the	 IMF	might	 consider	 is	 to	 switch	 its	 role	 from	 lender	of	 last	 resort	 to	smaller	 countries	 to	 supervisor	 of	 the	 global	 economy	 in	 order	 to	 maintain	financial	stability,	promote	high	employment	and	sustainable	economic	growth	and	 reduce	poverty	 around	 the	world.	 This	 is	within	 its	mandate	 from	 its	 189	Member	States.																																																										1	https://blogs.imf.org/2018/04/18/bringing-down-high-debt/	2	https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/90161/1/MPRA_paper_90161.pdf		
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																																																																																												Conversion	Theory	II:	the	case	for	Recession	Bonds	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning																																																												
1.	The	current	state	of	affairs	
	In	 its	 latest	 Quarterly	 Survey	 (December	 2018),	 the	 Bank	 for	 International	Settlements	 sums	up	 the	 current	 threats	 to	world	 economies3.	 It	 states	 among	others:	
 “Recent	 sharp	 selloffs	 across	 global	 financial	 markets	 are	 probably	 the	first	of	many,	 as	 investors	 adjust	 to	 a	world	of	tighter	monetary	 conditions	 and	the	threat	of	an	economic	downturn.	The	 year	 has	 been	 a	 tough	 one	 in	 the	 financial	 markets,	 with	 big	 drops	 in	European	and	Asian	stocks	and	even	U.S.	equities	recently	slipping	into	the	red	for	2018	after	a	decade-long	bull-run.	The	 last	quarter	saw	increasing	fears	 for	world	and	U.S.	economic	growth	as	trade	war	noise	escalated	and	central	banks	tightened	policy	or	prepared	to	withdraw	extraordinary	crisis-era	stimulus.	The	 “market	 tensions	we	 saw	during	 this	 quarter	were	not	 an	 isolated	 event,”	Claudio	Borio,	head	of	the	monetary	and	economic	department	at	the	BIS	said.	Monetary	 policy	 normalization	 was	 bound	 to	 be	 challenging	 especially	 in	light	of	trade	tensions	and	political	uncertainty.	Among	 the	 challenges	 facing	 the	 global	 economy	 are	 the	 possibility	of	rising	inflation,	the	“dark	cloud”	of	lower-rated	U.S.	corporate	debt	in	an	overstretched	market	and	weaknesses	in	the	European	banking	sector.	Recent	weeks	also	saw	short-dated	U.S.	government	bond	yields	briefly	rise	over	medium-term	rates,	a	phenomenon	known	as	a	“yield	curve	inversion”.	A	fairly	reliable	precursor	of	recessions,	the	inversion	further	spooked	investors.	Steadily	 rising	 U.S.	 interest	 rates	 may	 also	 put	 a	 squeeze	 on	 the	availability	of	dollars	—	 the	 global	 funding	 currency	of	choice.	 But	 the	BIS	 said	the	 financial	 sector’s	 ability	 to	 raise	 dollar	 funding	 outside	 the	 United	 States	could	mitigate	this	risk.	The	 Bank	 also	 warns	 that	 the	 pillars	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 system	 are	fundamentally	unstable	and	could	lead	to	a	frightening	chain	reaction	in	the	next	crisis.	 It	 commented	 on	 the	 risks	 associated	 with	 the	 Central	 Counterparty	Clearing	Houses.																																																														3	https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1812.pdf	
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																																																																																									Conversion	Theory	II:	the	case	for	Recession	Bonds	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			A	central	 counterparty-clearing	house	 (CCP)4	is	a	 corporate	entity	 that	 reduces	counterparty,	operational,	settlement,	market,	legal	and	default	risk	for	traders.			A	CCP	becomes	the	counterparty	to	the	buyer	and	the	seller	and	guarantees	the	terms	of	 a	 trade	even	 if	 one	party	defaults	on	 the	agreement.	The	CCP	collects	enough	money	from	each	buyer	and	seller	for	covering	potential	losses	incurred	by	not	 following	through	on	an	agreement,	resulting	 in	the	entity	replacing	the	trade	 at	 the	 current	 market	 price.	 Monetary	 requirements	 are	 based	 on	 each	trader’s	exposures	and	open	obligations.		These	 giant	 CCP’s	 clear	much	of	 the	 $540	 trillion	derivatives	 trades.	 The	Bank	warns	in	its	quarterly	report	that	the	CCPs	could	cause	“	a	destabilising	feedback	loop,	amplifying	stress”.	The	BIS	said	“balance	sheet	interlinkages	could	cause	a	CCP	 default	 waterfall.”	 The	 Bank	 concluded	 that	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 world’s	business	 cycle	 has	 changed	 over	 the	 last	 three	 decades.	 Offshore	 lending	 in	dollars	 by	 European,	 Japanese	 and	 increasingly	 Chinese	 and	 emerging	market	banks	 has	 risen	 to	 $12.8	 trillion.	 This	web	 of	 dollar	 liabilities	 is	 coming	under	strain	 as	 the	 U.S.	 Federal	 Reserve	 drains	 liquidity,	 pushing	 up	 global	 lending	rates.	The	BIS	concluded	that	cross-border	funding,	regardless	of	the	source,	may	be	fickle	in	a	crisis.”		The	current	 threats	 to	worldwide	economic	growth	do	not	come	 from	 just	one	source	in	particular,	like	in	the	case	of	the	U.S.	mortgage-backed	securities	crisis.	The	 potential	 sources	 are	 a	multiple:	 rising	 interest	 rates	 in	 the	 U.S.;	 offshore	lending	 in	 U.S.	 dollars;	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 derivatives	 clearing	 system;	 falling	stock	markets	`and	potential	trade	wars.			Perhaps	the	time	has	come	to	some	out	of	the	box	thinking.	One	possibility	is	the	creation	of	“Recession	Bonds”			
2.	The	concept	of	“Recession	Bonds”		What	are	recession	bonds	and	why	are	they	needed?		To	start	with	the	“Why	question”:	the	financial	crisis	started	in	the	U.S.	in	2007.	This	crisis	made	the	risks	of	financial	alchemy	abundantly	clear	with	extremely	serious	 repercussions	 to	 the	 economic	wellbeing	 of	 a	 large	 swathe	 of	 the	 U.S.	population.	The	act	of	securitization	turned	long	term	debt	obligations	into	daily	priced	obligations:	the	debt	conversion	process.	Investors	relied	on	credit	rating	agencies	to	assess	the	collective	risks	of	such	securities.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																				4	https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/ccph.asp	
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																																																																																												Conversion	Theory	II:	the	case	for	Recession	Bonds	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			Often	 AA	 or	 AA+	 credit	 ratings	 were	 attached	 to	 the	 securities.	 What	 –in	hindsight-	was	overlooked	was	that	future	provisions	for	doubtful	debtors	were	not	included	in	the	price	setting	of	the	securities.	Bankers,	often	knowingly,	sold	“dud”	products	to	the	markets,	making	great	institutional	and	personal	fortunes	in	the	process.		One	of	the	main	results	was	that	nearly	7	million	U.S.	individuals	lost	their	jobs	between	May	2007	and	October	2009	and	that	the	U.S.	unemployment	rate	shot	up	 from	 4.4%	 in	May	 2007	 to	 10%	 by	 October	 2009.	 Real	median	 household	incomes	 dropped	 by	 9.2%	 from	 $59,534	 in	 2007	 to	 $54,569	 in	 2012.	 House	prices	and	new	housing	starts	also	dropped	substantially.		The	U.S.	housing	crisis	had	international	ramifications.	In	the	U.S.	itself	it	was	the	dramatic	effect	on	government	finances,	an	effect	that	has	lasted	to	current	days.	In	December	 2007,	U.S.	 government	 debt	 to	GDP	 reached	 a	 level	 of	 64.7%.	By	September	2018	it	had	increased	to	104.1%	of	GDP.	To	put	it	another	way:	at	the	end	of	Q4	2007	the	U.S.	Federal	Government	debt	level	stood	at	$9.2	trillion;	by	Q4	2009	it	was	$12.3	trillion,	by	Q4	2010	the	level	stood	at	$14.0	trillion	and	the	latest	data	for	2018	show	a	figure	of	$21.2	trillion.5	On	top	of	this,	after	the	2008	financial	 crisis,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 printed	money	 to	 the	 extent	 of	 some	 $3.5	trillion.	The	real	GDP	 figures	show	a	drop	 from	Q4	2007	 to	Q4	2009	or	 in	real	amounts	 from	$15.8	 trillion	to	$15.3	 trillion	by	Q4	2009.6	The	huge	 increase	 in	government	debt	during	this	period	was	unable	to	stop	real	GDP	falling.		For	 the	combined	Eurozone	countries,	government	debt	 to	GDP	 levels	 stood	at	62.9%	 by	 December	 2007.	 Due	 to	 the	 recession	 effects,	 it	 reached	 91.9%	 in	20147.		The	most	recent	figure	for	2017	assessed	this	level	at	86.7%.		An	 economic	 crisis	 in	 a	major	 country	 spreads	 around	 the	 globe	 and	 very	 few	economies	do	not	suffer	when	the	largest	economies	go	into	a	recession	period.	For	instance,	trade	volumes	go	down	in	recession	times:	in	2008	the	real	level	of	U.S.	imports	of	goods	and	services	was	$2.55	trillion	on	an	annual	basis.	By		2009	this	 level	 had	 dropped	 to	 $1.97	 trillion	 or	 over	 $580	 billion	 less	 in	 annual	imports8.	Less	imports	into	the	U.S.	meant	less	exports	from	other	countries.		Less	 trade	 also	 impacts	 corporate	 investment	 intentions,	 thereby	 impacting	economic	growth	rates	further.		Stock	 markets	 are	 another	 example	 of	 international	 interrelationships.	 The	largest	 companies	 in	 the	world	do	not	 just	depend	on	 the	 sales	 in	one	market,	but	depend	on	such	sales	levels	in	a	multiple	of	markets.																																																									5	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GFDEBTN	6https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPC1	7	https://tradingeconomics.com/euro-area/government-debt-to-gdp	8	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IEAMGSA	
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																																																														Conversion	Theory	II:	the	case	for	Recession	Bonds	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			What	the	U.S.	experience	shows	is	that	the	additional	government	debt	created	over	the	period	Q4	2007	to	Q4	2009		($3.1	trillion)	was	unable	to	reverse	or	even	arrest	 the	 loss	 in	 real	 GDP	 growth;	 the	 latter	 still	 showed	 an	 absolute	 loss	 of	$500	billion	 over	 the	 same	period.	 The	Fed	 through	quantitative	 easing	 added	another	$3.5	trillion	to	the	financial	markets.			Accordingly,	a	different	approach	 for	 fighting	a	 recession	 is	merited:	Recession	Bonds.	Recession	bonds	help	to	convert	long-term	government	debt	into	current	short-term	government	expenditure:	the	conversion	process!	Financial	alchemy	with	more	noble	results,	representing	a	conversion	from	financial	sector	assets	into	real	sector	economic	activities.				
2.1	Recession	bonds		Recessions	bonds	are	ordinary	government	bonds	(Treasuries	in	some	countries	like	in	the	U.S	or	Gilts	in	the	U.K.),	but	with	a	special	feature.	The	feature	is	that	interest	 and	 some	 repayment	obligations	 can	be	postponed	 from	 the	 start	of	 a	recession	period	until	the	end	of	such	period.	In	doing	so	and	in	the	situation	that	a	substantial	share	of	government	debt	is	converted	into	Recession	Bonds,	such	conversion	 provides	 a	 government	 with	 ample	 funds	 to	 support	 economic	activities	and	to	stimulate	economic	growth	during	a	recession	without	having	to	resort	to	additional	borrowings:	it	relies	on	the	financial	markets	to	grant	it	the	option	 to	 enhance	 government	 expenditure	needed	 to	 get	 an	 economy	back	 to	economic	growth	levels.	It	is	the	option	to	turn	financial	powers	of	investors	into	real	sector	activities:	the	conversion	from	long-term	borrowings	into	short-term	cash	 injections	 into	 the	 real	 sector.	 A	 recession	 period	 is	 the	 time	when	 such	conversion	is	most	needed.		Recession	 Bonds	 do	 not	 increase	 the	 outstanding	 level	 of	 government	 bonds;	they	alter	the	debt	servicing	level	by	moving	obligations	to	future	years,	 just	as	an	upward	change	in	the	fixed	or	variable	interest	rate	would	do.			The	pre-requirements	for	a	successful	program	of	Recession	Bonds	are:		1.	 Having	 a	 series	 of	 economic	 activities	 ready	 to	 be	 executed	 as	 and	when	 a	recession	period	starts;		2.	Having	a	 sufficient	 level	of	 long-term	bonds	either	 issued	or	converted	 from	already	outstanding	long-term	bonds	into	Recession	Bonds;																																																																																																
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																																																																																							Conversion	Theory	II:	the	case	for	Recession	Bonds	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			3.	 Having	 a	 pricing	 structure	 of	 the	 bonds,	 which	 reward	 the	 holders	 of	 such	bonds	for	accepting	the	temporary	postponement	of	interest	payments	and	some	principal	payments;	typically	for	a	maximum	period	of	two	to	three	years;			4.	Having	a	pricing	structure	which	is	attractive	to	investors.	The	target	group	of	investors	will	be	worldwide	pension	 funds	and	banks.	Pricing	could	be	set	at	a	premium	of	approximately	0.5%	over	existing	thirty-year	bond	rates.		5.	 The	 assessment	 of	 when	 a	 recession	 starts	 and	 when	 it	 finishes	 should	 be	made	by	a	neutral	international	body.	The	ideal	one	is	the	IMF.	This	role	is	fully	compliant	with	 the	 IMF	Charter.	 It	would	have	 the	 capability	 to	 decide	 –in	 co-operation	with	countries	concerned-	the	timing	of	when	a	recession	period	starts	and	 when	 it	 finishes.	 	 It	 would	 also	 decide,	 again	 after	 consultation	 with	 a	government	involved,	the	percentage	of	the	principal	payment	that	is	rolled	over	to	 the	 period	 after	 the	 recession.	 Such	 powers,	 if	 granted	 to	 the	 IMF,	 would	enable	 the	 IMF	 to	 steer	 various	 economies,	 including	 the	 largest	 ones,	simultaneously	out	of	recessions.		6.	The	IMF	could	also	assist	countries	in	choosing	which	activities	would	be	most	effective	for	turning	around	a	recession	period.	Different	countries	might	require	different	solutions.			7.	 The	 existence	 of	 Recession	 Bonds	 will	 transform	 the	 IMF	 from	 an	 agency	extending	 loans	 as	 a	 priority	 fund	 provider	 to	 smaller	 countries	 to	 an	organization	helping	the	big	economies	to	shorten	their	recession	periods.	Over	time,	smaller	countries	may	also	be	able	to	issue	Recession	Bonds.		8.	 All	 countries	wishing	 to	 utilize	 Recession	 Bonds	 need	 to	 sign	 an	 agreement	with	 the	 IMF,	 so	 that	providers	of	 the	 funds	 can	 count	on	 the	neutrality	of	 the	Fund	to	assess	the	starting	and	the	finishing	dates	of	the	recession	period.		9.	 All	 amounts	 affected	 by	 the	 temporary	 waivers	 of	 interest	 and	 principal	amounts	will	need	to	be	included	in	the	payments	to	be	made	after	the	recession	period	is	over.				
	3.	The	role	of	the	IMF	
	One	has	 to	be	realistic	 in	what	 the	 IMF	currently	can	and	cannot	do.	 It	has	 the	firepower	of	$1	trillion	in	available	funds,	made	available	by	the	richer	countries.	Such	amount	is	dwarfed	by	the	$61	trillion	of	outstanding	levels	of	government	debt	in	the	world.			
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																																																																																																																							Conversion	Theory	II:	the	case	for	Recession	Bonds	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		The	concept	of	the	IMF	supplying	funds	to	smaller	countries	is	perhaps	outdated,	especially	 since	 2008.	 The	 capital	 markets	 have	 shown	 themselves	 capable	 of	raising	 $164	 trillion.	 The	world	 does	 not	 have	 a	 shortage	 of	 savings,	 but	 such	savings	 can	 be	 used	 more	 efficiently.	 	 Some	 lenders	 and	 borrowers	 could	contractually	agree	 that	some	debt	servicing	during	recession	periods	 is	not	 in	the	 interest	 of	 either	 lenders	 or	 government	 borrowers.	 	 Such	 debt	 servicing	could	 be	 more	 effectively	 used	 for	 stimulating	 economic	 growth	 in	 order	 to	shorten	and	reduce	the	level	of	economic	displacements:	the	conversion	process	from	 long	 into	 short-term	 without	 increasing	 the	 outstanding	 level	 of	borrowings.	 It	 will	 also	 be	 a	 conversion	 from	 financial	 assets	 into	 real	 sector	economic	activities.			What	 the	 financial	 sector	needs	 is	 an	 independent	 arbitrator	 to	decide	when	a	recession	 starts	 and	when	 it	 finishes	 and	 equally	 important	 how	much	 of	 the	principal	amount	due	should	be	included.	Such	decision	should	be	based	on	pure	economic	arguments	and	not	on	political	considerations.	Of	course	such	decision	should	be	the	result	of	a	discussion	between	the	country	concerned	and	the	IMF,	but	ultimately	the	IMF	should	be	given	the	powers	to	act	independently.		A	 contract	 between	 the	 country	 concerned	 and	 the	 IMF	 can	 establish	 such	independence.		In	 giving	 such	 powers	 to	 the	 IMF,	 it	 will	 enable	 the	 Fund	 not	 just	 help	 to	overcome	 a	 recession	 period	 in	 one	 country,	 but	 simultaneously	 do	 this	 for	various	countries	affected	by	a	global	recession.	Country	Recession	Bonds	enable	the	IMF	to	act	globally	to	fight	recessions,	without	having	itself	to	raise	trillions	of	 U.S.	 dollars	 or	 the	 equivalent	 in	 other	 currencies.	 Smaller	 countries	 will	automatically	benefit	from	the	reduced	duration	and	less	deep	recessions	in	the	world’s	major	economies.			The	conversion	of	part	of	an	outstanding	long-term	government	debt	into	short-term	government	expenditure	constitutes	a	conversion	of	a	 financial	asset	 into	current	expenditure.			
4.	The	fund	providers	
	The	 logical	buyers	of	Recession	Bonds	would	be	 the	worldwide	banking	sector	and	 the	world’s	 pension	 funds.	 The	 latter	 collectively	manage	 $41.4	 trillion	 in	assets	 according	 to	 a	 recent	 study9.	 	 The	 world’s	 asset	 managers	 collectively	manage	even	more	of	the	world’s	financial	assets	on	behalf	of	third	parties.	The	central	banks	that	have	been	involved	in	quantitative	easing	could	in	particular																																																																																																																																																		9	Willis,	Towers	Watson	Global	Pension	Assets	study	2017	
	 10	
																																																																																											Conversion	Theory	II:	the	case	for	Recession	Bonds	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			be	helpful	to	start	up	the	process	of	converting	existing	government	bonds	into	Recession	 Bonds.	 They	 are	 the	 U.S.	 Federal	 Reserve,	 the	 Bank	 of	 England,	 the	European	Central	Bank	and	 the	Bank	of	 Japan.	The	 latter	 four	have	acquired	a	sizeable	slice	of	world	government	debt	by	acquiring	their	respective	country’s	government	bonds	through	Quantitative	Easing	programs.		To	start	with	the	Fed’s	example,	 its	quantitative	easing	program	bought	up	U.S.	government	 treasuries	 and	 some	 mortgage	 bonds	 issued	 by	 government-sponsored	 enterprises,	 like	 Fannie	May	 and	 Freddie	Mac.	 This	 act	was	 a	 pure	financial	transaction:	 it	replaced	the	holders	of	such	securities	from	the	private	sector	to	a	central	bank	holding.	In	the	U.S.	about	$3.5	trillion	was	pumped	into	the	 financial	markets	 in	 this	manner.	The	hope	was	 that	such	money	would	be	used	 to	 stimulate	 the	 real	 economy.	 It	 did	help	 lower	 long-term	 interest	 rates,	but	one	may	express	doubts	that	 it	 led	to	more	actual	government	spending	as	the	 dates	 of	 purchase	 fell	 mostly	 after	 the	 2008-2009-recession	 period.	 QE	facilitated	a	transfer	of	ownership	of	government	debt,	but	QE	did	not	 increase	government	 spending	 levels	 at	 a	 time	when	many	 individual	 households	 faced	their	most	serious	financial	crisis	for	many	years.		What	 the	Fed	might	now	consider	 is	 to	 stop	selling	back	such	securities	 to	 the	financial	markets,	but	to	wait	to	the	next	financial	crisis,	which	according	to	the	BIS	and	others	might	not	be	too	far	off.	If	such	event	happens,	the	Fed	could	be	the	 first	 to	 turn	 its	 existing	U.S.	 government	 Treasury	 holdings	 into	 Recession	Bonds.		The	 ECB	 is	 in	 a	 somewhat	 different	 position	 in	 that	 the	 government	 bonds	 it	purchased,	 are	 denominated	 in	 Euros,	 but	 are	 country	 bonds	 from	 different	countries	in	the	Eurozone.	The	debt	titles	held	are	country	specific,	rather	than	a	collective	debt	title.	However	the	ECB	could	help	countries	like	Italy	and	Spain	by	converting	the	ECB	holdings	from	these	countries	into	Recession	Bonds.	This	will	help	these	countries	to	cope	with	a	potential	recession	period.		For	 the	 worldwide	 banking	 sector	 converting	 short-term	 client	 deposits	 into	long-term	government	 security	holdings	has	 always	been	a	major	 activity.	The	ability	to	convert	such	holdings	back	into	cash,	as	and	when	needed,	has	always	existed,	as	there	are	huge	markets	to	supply	funds	to	these	markets.		In	order	for	the	banking	sector	to	participate	in	turning	some	of	its	holdings	into	Recession	 Bonds,	 a	 few	 elements	 need	 to	 be	 clarified.	 The	 first	 element	 is	 the	accounting	rules	to	be	applied	to	Recession	Bonds.	It	could	be	decided	that,	since	government	 debt	 is	 the	 safest	 category	 of	 debt,	 income	 of	 interest	 can	 be	recognized	 accounting	 wise	 in	 the	 year	 that	 it	 originally	 was	 due,	notwithstanding	that	it	will	be	received	two	or	three	years	later.	However,	no	tax	should	be	levied	until	actual	cash	has	been	received.		
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4.1	Positive	effects	of	using	Recession	Bonds	
	The	 BIS	 report,	 quoted	 above,	 makes	 clear	 that	 there	 has	 been	 a	 structural	change	 in	 the	 level	 of	 government	 debt	 outstanding	 in	 the	 U.S.,	 but	 equally	 in	other	countries.	The	more	than	doubling	of	U.S.	government	debt	to	over	100%	of	 GDP	 over	 the	 period	 2008-2018	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 a	 pattern	 that	 can	 be	repeated	over	the	next	decade.			It	 is	 therefore	essential	 to	 find	 instruments	 that	can	shorten	recession	periods,	not	just	for	one	country,	but	also	for	the	global	economy.	One	option	is	to	create	Recession	Bonds.		Recession	Bonds	will	turn	financial	assets	into	real	sector	economic	activities	at	a	time	when	such	cash	injections	are	most	needed.	Increased	economic	activities	also	 imply	 increasing	 tax	 revenues.	 The	 existence	 and	 use	 of	 Recession	 Bonds	have	the	potential	to	improve	the	credit	rating	of	the	more	vulnerable	countries,	provided	that	the	largest	economies	also	sign	up	to	such	action.	It	is	likely	that	a	better	 balance	 can	 be	 maintained	 between	 the	 ever-growing	 powers	 of	 the	financial	sector	and	real	sector	activities	not	just	in	one	country,	but	also	in	the	largest	 countries	 in	 the	 world.	 Smaller	 countries	 will	 benefit	 from	 such	 an	approach.			
4.2	Some	practical	implications			Pension	funds	do	not	experience	any	tax	implications	in	maintaining	a	Recession	Bond	 portfolio,	 as	 they	 usually	 pay	 no	 tax	 over	 incomes.	 The	 pensioners,	 as	receivers	 of	 the	 pension	 payments,	 are	 usually	 liable	 for	 income	 tax.	 These	pensioners	will	notice	no	difference	in	their	pension	payments.		For	banks	it	is	important	to	maintain	a	solid	backing	for	their	liabilities.	Hence	it	is	 recommended	 that	 interest	 due	 over	 a	 government’s	 Recession	 Bonds	 be	accounted	 for	 as	 received	 as	 if	 they	 were	 normal	 bonds;	 tax-wise	 the	 income	flow	would	reflect	the	actual	time	payments	from	a	government.		It	is	important	that	there	will	be	an	active	market	in	such	bonds,	with	daily	price	setting.	 For	 banks	 it	 is	 also	 essential	 that	 Central	 Banks	 operate	 repurchase	agreements	for	Recession	Bonds,	if	needed.		Finally,	 shortening	a	recession	period	as	a	real	sector	experience	will	also	help	the	 stock	markets,	 as	 volatility	 levels	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 reduced.	 The	 real	 sector	supports	 the	 financial	 sector,	a	conversion	 from	short-term	economic	activities	into	long-term	benefits.																																																														
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5.	Some	conclusions	
	Threats	 to	 economic	 activity	 levels	 can	 come	 from	 a	 multitude	 of	 sources..	Government	 debt	 levels	 compared	 to	 their	 respective	 GDP	 have	 risen	 sharply	over	 the	 last	 ten	years,	even	 for	 the	most	developed	countries.	Continuation	of	this	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 an	 option	 for	 the	 next	 decade.	 The	 key	 in	 understanding	what	can	and	cannot	be	done	is	linked	to	the	relationships	between	the	financial	sector	 and	 the	 real	 sector:	 the	 latter	 being	 the	 sector	 of	 expenditure	 in	 the	current	period.			The	 financial	 sector	 can	 pose	 a	 threat	 to	 real	 expenditure	 levels	 through	 its	conversion	mechanisms,	 turning	 long-term	debt	 into	daily	 tradable	obligations.	This	 happened	 during	 the	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2008	 in	 the	 U.S.	 when	 long	 term	home	 mortgage	 obligations	 were	 converted	 into	 daily	 tradable	 ones.	 When	doubts	 arose	 about	 the	 quality	 of	 some	 loans	 incorporated	 in	 the	 mortgage-backed	 securities,	 the	 liquidity	 to	 trade	 in	 these	 funds	 disappeared	 and	 a	 race	was	started	to	force	mortgage	holders	to	pay	back	their	mortgages.	Some	41.4%	of	all	U.S.	mortgage	holders	were	confronted	with	foreclosure	proceedings	over	the	period	2007-2014!		This	 in	 itself	 led	 to	 high	U.S.	 unemployment	 levels,	 dropping	 house	 prices	 and	very	 low	 levels	 of	 new	 housing	 starts.	 It	 also	 led	 to	 the	 explosion	 in	 U.S.	government	debt	 levels.	 It	 furthermore	led	to	an	international	recession	period	as	lower	trade	levels	and	the	active	participation	of	overseas	financial	investors	in	 the	 U.S.	 mortgage	 backed	 securities	 markets	 –both	 as	 originators	 and	 as	savers-	created	a	downward	pressure	on	financial	assets	in	other	markets,	away	from	the	U.S.		It	is	unlikely	that	during	the	next	decade	governments	can	or	should	allow	such	ballooning	of	debt	levels.		It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 the	 suggestion	 was	 made	 in	 this	 paper	 to	 use	 the	financial	 sector	 assets	of	one	 type	of	particular	borrowers:	 i.e.	 governments	 as	the	 stepping-stone	 to	 a	 quicker	 economic	 recovery.	 Recession	 Bonds	 could	 be		the	vehicle	of	choice,	especially	 if	 the	rules	to	use	them	are	administered	by	an	independent	international	agency	such	as	the	I.M.F.			The	conversion	of	financial	assets	into	real	sector	activities	can	be	achieved	with	the	help	of	Recession	Bonds,	thereby	mitigating	the	economic	harm	wrought	by	a	recession.		Drs	Kees	De	Koning	Chorleywood,	U.K.	2nd	January	2019																																																																																																
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Appendix	1:	the	Conversion	process	
	The	 conversion	 of	 interest	 due	 over	 outstanding	 Recession	 Bonds	 into	 actual	government	expenditure	during	a	recession	period	is	a	relatively	simple	process.	Recession	bondholders	will	 have	 agreed	 that	 a	 government	during	 a	 recession	will	make	no	interest	payments.	The	IMF	will	closely	monitor	the	start	and	finish	of	the	recession	period.	Such	interest	payment	waiver	leads	to	less	debt	servicing	expenditure	 by	 a	 government	 during	 a	 recession	 period	 and	 thereby	 more	money	available	for	fighting	a	recession.		What	is	slightly	more	complicated	is	how	to	deal	with	the	repayments	element	as	in	many	cases	during	a	recession	period	no	repayments	need	to	be	made	on	the	outstanding	 long-term	government	bonds.	 In	this	case	a	variant	of	Quantitative	Easing	(VQE)	could	be	introduced.	Instead	of	buying	up	outstanding	government	bonds	 in	 the	 market,	 which	 represents	 a	 financial	 sector	 to	 financial	 sector	action,	 a	 central	 bank	 could	 assist	 in	 turning	 a	 financial	 sector	 claim	 into	 real	current	government	expenditure	through	a	VQE	process.		VQE	 could	 work	 as	 follows:	 The	 IMF,	 a	 central	 bank	 and	 a	 government	 could	agree	on	the	volume	of	VQE	needed	during	the	recession	period.	This	volume	of	funds	is	created	by	a	central	bank,	just	like	in	the	case	of	QE.		However	a	link	is	made	 with	 the	 volume	 of	 outstanding	 Recession	 Bonds	 and	 a	 percentage	 is	assessed	 of	 the	 principal	 amounts	 outstanding.	 What	 happens	 next	 is	 that	 a	central	bank,	rather	than	spending	this	money	on	actively	buying	up	outstanding	government	 bonds	 (the	 current	 QE	 process),	 it	 transfers	 such	 funds	 to	 a	government	for	fighting	a	recession	(VQE).	The	difference	between	QE	and	VQE	is	 that	 in	 the	 VQE	 case	 the	money	 used	 is	 converted	 from	 the	 financial	 sector	directly	 into	real	economic	sector	activities,	while	 in	the	QE	case	 it	would	have	been	a	transaction	between	financial	sector	participants	only.		The	safeguards	in	monitoring	the	process	need	to	be	in	the	hands	of	the	IMF	with	full	collaboration	of	a	central	bank.		Repayments	 of	 such	 money	 to	 a	 central	 bank	 should	 come	 out	 of	 future	government	budgets,	when	an	economy	is	back	to	economic	growth	levels.		VQE	applies	the	conversion	method	from	long-term	financial	sector	transactions	into	 short-term	government	 expenditure	 as	 and	when	needed.	QE	does	not	do	this.	Safeguards	will	need	to	be	in	place	to	ensure	that	VQE	is	not	an	open-ended	process.	
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